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TECHNOLOGY AND MOTHERHOOD:
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
EGG DONATION
John A. Robertson*
Past advances in medical technology have allowed many
infertile couples an opportunity to raise a family through the
use of a wide variety of noncoital reproductive techniques be-
yond the traditional adoption arrangement. More recently, an-
other choice has been added to the list - egg donation. This
new procedure brings with it unique ethical and legal issues
that have yet to be addressed by society. There is no doubt that
egg donation will be welcomed by many couples who have been
previously unable or unwilling to take advantage of other re-
productive options. In light of this development, now is the time
to examine the impact that egg donation may have on families,
offspring, donors, and society.
THE WIDE ARRAY of noncoital reproductive techniques now
available to treat infertility, such as in vitro fertilization (IVF),
embryo freezing, artificial insemination, and surrogacy, has been
welcomed by infertile couples seeking to rear biologically related
offspring. Use of these techniques, however, has raised significant
legal, ethical, and policy issues and has stirred great controversy,
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as the Baby M case has shown.
Controversy arises because noncoital reproduction raises
profound questions about the scope of procreative liberty and fam-
ily privacy, the welfare of offspring, the meaning of family, and
the moral tone of society. Providing answers to these questions is
complicated by a lack of empirical data about actual effects on
couples and offspring, and by the strong emotions and fantasies
about life, death, sexuality, and reproductive roles which noncoital
reproduction inevitably stimulates.
A striking aspect of the current situation is the continual un-
folding of new reproductive variations even before the old ones are
fully assimilated into the social fabric. Extensions of external fer-
tilization of human eggs are a case in point. While IVF is availa-
ble at some 150 programs nationwide, important questions about
embryo status, quality control, and financing have not been re-
solved.' Despite these questions, many IVF programs have gone a
step further and are now offering cryopreservation of embryos,
which greatly complicates the issues that arise with basic IVF.2
Nevertheless, technical progress continues apace. In the past
year IVF programs in the United States and abroad have begun
to offer egg donation to women unable to produce a viable or
healthy egg, thus marking a further advance in noncoital or as-
sisted reproduction. Although female gamete donation deepens the
ethical and legal quandaries of IVF, once technical problems are
overcome, egg donation is likely to be readily accepted into the
armamentarium of available infertility treatments. As the female
equivalent of the widely accepted practice of artificial insemina-
tion with donor sperm (AID),3 egg donation should generate little
of the the controversy now surrounding surrogacy and other
techniques.
Yet, egg donation differs in important respects from IVF and
donor sperm, and thus deserves independent consideration. Eggs
are less plentiful and more difficult to retrieve than sperm, creat-
ing greater risks for the donor. Moreover, the egg donor and re-
cipient will be playing novel reproductive roles. A woman who do-
1. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFER-
TILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 139-46, 169-76, 311-20 (1988) [hereinafter CON-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES].
2. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Cryopreservation of Human Embryos, 47
FERTILITY & STERILITY 371 (1987).
3. Thirty states have statutes explicitly recognizing artificial insemination with donor
sperm. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 242-44.
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nates an egg will have no gestational or rearing role with her
genetic offspring, while the gestational mother will not be the ge-
netic parent of the child she births and rears.4 Technology thus
separates female genetic, gestational and social parentage in a
unique way.
Are these differences of ethical, legal, or policy significance?
Do they require safeguards and protections beyond those that now
exist with AID? With egg donation on the verge of acceptance
into the mainstream of IVF infertility practice, it is an appropri-
ate time to consider the ethical, legal, and policy issues raised.
Examination of these issues will reveal many of the themes and
problems raised by new reproductive technologies generally.
I. MEDICAL FACTORS AND SCOPE OF PRACTICE
Egg donation evolves logically from basic IVF-the ability to
hyperstimulate the ovaries, remove multiple oocytes (eggs) and
fertilize them externally before placement in the uterus. When
fertilization occurs externally, the fertilized eggs may be placed in
the uterus of a woman who has not provided the egg, thus opening
the door to egg donation.' A brief discussion of the need for egg
donation, the medical procedures involved, and the scope of the
practice follows.
A. The Need for Egg Donation
Candidates for egg donation fall into two major categories:
those with and those without ovarian function." Women may lack
ovarian function due to primary reasons such as gonadal dys-
genesis, an insensitive ovary, or autoimmunity.7 Ovarian function
may also be absent due to premature menopause of varying etiol-
ogy, including surgically absent ovaries, chemotherapy or radio-
4. In egg donation the rearing father will also be the genetic father. If the rearing
mother gestates but the rearing father has no genetic connection with the offspring, the
couple has received a donation of both egg and sperm (either separately or in the form of
an embryo donation), rather than simply an egg donation. If the egg donor rears the off-
spring, a gestational surrogacy arrangement has occurred.
5. The donor oocyte also may he inserted into the recipient's fallopian tube in a
GIFT procedure, or be obtained after in vivo insemination and lavage. See infra notes 16-
18 and accompanying text. Note that "egg," "oocyte," and "ovum" are used interchangea-
bly in this Article.
6. Rosenwaks, Donor Eggs: Their Application in Modern Reproductive Technology,
47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 895 (1987).
7. Id. at 897-98.
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therapy-induced ovarian failure.' Over 100,000 women may suffer
from premature menopause due to these causes.9 If ovarian func-
tion is absent, estrogen and progesterone replacement therapy will
be necessary to prepare the endometrium of the uterus and main-
tain the pregnancy.10
Women with normal ovarian function may also benefit from
oocyte donation. Women who are unable to conceive coitally may
be unable to participate successfully in IVF due to anatomically
inaccessible ovaries, repetitive failure with IVF, abnormal oocytes,
problems in fertilizing in vitro despite apparently normal gametes,
or a specific medical contraindication to surgical ovum harvest.1
Donor oocytes may enable these women to become pregnant.
Finally, egg donation may be used to avoid the transmission
of autosomal dominant or sex-linked genetic disorders to offspring,
regardless of whether normal menstrual function is present or ab-
sent. For example, oocyte donation will enable a couple to have a
child when they are both carriers of autosomal recessive traits and
the couple is unwilling to use donor insemination. 2
B. Donor Egg Procedures and the Problem of Synchronization
Critical to the achievement of pregnancy by egg donation is
the creation of a viable embryo that can be transferred into a re-
ceptive endometrial or uterine milieu. Successful pregnancy with
donor oocytes thus depends on appropriate embryo-endometrial
synchronization. Yet much remains unknown about how to syn-
chronize the ovulatory process in the donor with endometrial mat-
uration in the recipient. For example, the size of the window of
endometrial receptivity, the optimal stage for transfer of the con-
ceptus, and the hormonal balance necessary to achieve a success-
ful transfer are not precisely known. 3 Current protocols aim to
furnish a four to six-cell embryo for transfer on days seventeen to
nineteen of the recipient's cycle, thus mimicking nature's syn-
8. Id.
9. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 1988, at 4B, col. 1.
10. Rosenwaks, supra note 6, at 900-06.
11. Id. at 897-98.
12. Having the couple at risk for a genetic defect resort to egg donation rather than
donor sperm might seem unduly oppressive to the woman. However, it will preserve a bio-
logical (though not genetic) link with each rearing parent. The recipient of an egg donation
actually undergoes less physical risk and intrusion than does a woman undergoing IVF,
since she does not undergo hyperstimualtion and surgical removal of eggs.
13. Rosenwaks, supra note 6, at 905-07.
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chrony of conceptus and endometrium. 14 A previously defined en-
dometrial histology for the day of transfer allows maximal syn-
chronization of endometrium and conceptus.
The recipient with ovarian failure will undergo estrogen and
progesterone replacement in order to prepare the endometrial bed
and maintain the pregnancy. 15 Recipients with normal ovarian
function will only need to be monitored so that egg retrieval and
fertilization can be synchronized with the recipient's cycle.
Two ways of donating eggs without in vitro fertilization
should be noted. One variation, called surrogate embryo transfer,
donates the egg in the form of an embryo that has been fertilized
by in vivo artificial insemination of the donor with the recipient's
partner's sperm. The developing embryo is then removed prior to
implantation by uterine lavage and transferred to the recipient's
uterus."6 After some initial success and wide publicity, donation
by lavage has received less attention because of the attendant risk
of pregnancy to the donor, and the progress made with other
forms of egg donation.
Oocyte donation may also occur without IVF and embryo
transfer through gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT). In GIFT
the donated eggs are inserted during laparoscopy, along with part-
ner sperm, directly into the recipient's fallopian tubes, the natural
locus of fertilization. 8 Since GIFT ordinarily requires the recipi-
ent to undergo laparoscopy, it is less preferable than receiving a
donor egg fertilized in vitro and transferred nonsurgically to the
14. Id. at 905.
15. Recipients of donor eggs by means of surrogate embryo transfer will require syn-
chronization and ovarian function replacement if normal menstrual function is absent.
16. Bustillo, Buster, Cohen, Thorneycraft, Simon, Boyers, Marshall, Seed, Louw &
Seed, Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer as a Treatment in Infertile Women: Preliminary Expe-
rience, 251 J. A.MA. 1171, 1171-73 (1984) [hereinafter Bustillo]; Formigli, Formigli &
Graziella, Pregnancy and Delivery in Two Women with Ovarian Failure following Non-
surgical Transfer of In Vivo Fertilized Uterine Ova, 256 J. A.M.A. 1442 (1986)(letter to J.
A.M.A.) [hereinafter Formigli].
17. This procedure carries the risk of normal or ectopic pregnancy for the donor if
the lavage is unsuccessful. For this reason, it has been discouraged and is not as widely
used as other egg donation techniques. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 47S, 47S-48S (1986) [hereinafter American Fertility Society]. But cf. Formigli,
supra note 16 (stating that nonsurgical donor ovum transfer will be a practical and efficient
method of treatment for women lacking ovarian function who would otherwise be sterile).
18. Asch, Balmaceda, Ord, Borrero, Cefalu, Gastaldi & Rojas, Gocyte Donation and
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer As Treatment for Premature Ovarian Failure, 1987 THE
LANCET 687 (letter to the editor).
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recipient. However, if GIFT offers a higher chance of pregnancy,
the recipient is otherwise undergoing laparoscopic surgery, or non-
surgical transfer becomes possible, then GIFT may be the proce-
dure of choice.
C. Present Availability of Egg Donation
While several births from donor oocytes have been reported,
the procedure is still considered experimental. Yet, progress is
rapidly occurring, and preliminary reports indicate that egg dona-
tion will be successful for an important subset of infertility
problems. Reports of pregnancy and healthy birth after oocyte do-
nation have included births after in vivo insemination and uterine
lavage, births following GIFT use of donor eggs, and births in
which ovarian function is both present and absent."9 While the
reported number of births is currently less than fifty, one may ex-
pect this number to rise rapidly in the next few years.
As oocyte donation techniques become successful, many IVF
programs will make this service available to the subset of patients
who could benefit from it. The Jones Institute in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, the largest and most successful IVF group in the United
States, already has an active egg donation program using eggs ob-
tained in the course of the IVF process.2" Programs in New York
City and New York's Westchester County pay women undergoing
tubal ligation for hyperstimulation and egg retrieval.21 Still others,
such as the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, recruit donors
who are not undergoing IVF or sterilization, and pay them up to
$1,200 for serving as egg donors.22 A program at the University of
Texas Health Science Center in Houston follows a common prac-
tice, requiring the recipient to bring her own donor to the clinic.2"
Internationally, egg donation is available in Australia, Great Brit-
19. Navot, Laufer & Kopolovic, Artificially Induced Endometrial Cycles and Estab-
lishment of Pregnancies in the Absence of Ovaries, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 806, 806-11
(1986) [hereinafter Navot]; Lutjen, Leeton & Findlay, Oocyte and Embryo Donation in
IVF Programmes, 12 CLINICS IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 799 (1985).
20. Rosenwaks, supra note 6, at 898. Since this program will not transfer more than
five embryos to the uterus of the woman undergoing IVF, women are asked to consent to
donation of eggs in excess of five prior to fertilization.
21. Broznan, Babies From Donated Eggs: Growing Use Stirs Questions, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
22. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1987, at A16, col. 2. The first birth in the Cleveland pro-
gram occured in October, 1988. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 1988, at 4B, col. 1.
23. Interview with Dr. Craig Winkel, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston (Jan. 22, 1987).
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ain, Europe, and Israel, among other places.
II. ETHICAL STATUS
At a time of controversy and debate about new reproductive
technologies, egg donation has received relatively little attention.24
The many official or quasi-official advisory bodies and commis-
sions that have reported on new reproductive techniques in the last
several years mention egg donation briefly, if they mention it at
all, then proceed to treat it under the same general conditions that
apply to donor sperm.25 When compared to surrogacy and embryo
24. Legally, there is almost no positive law on this topic. No American legislation or
case law exists. Indeed, Victoria, Australia is the only jurisdiction with legislation in force
that explicitly applies to egg donation (Victoria includes it in AID legislation). Thus, egg
donation is clearly legal to perform throughout the world, but there is no imprimatur of
acceptability and no definitive set of legal rules or mandated pattern to follow in forming
families with donor eggs.
25. In the United States, the 1979 Ethics Advisory Board Report did not address the
topic (egg donation was not yet an available option, since IVF itself was still in ethical and
medical doubt). HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033 passim (1979). The American Fertility Society's
1986 report approved its use in certain circumstances. American Fertility Society, supra
note 17, at 1:1S, 42S-44S.
The British Warncock Committee, the Ontario Law Reform Commission and several
Australian reports have given egg donation more extended attention. They have even
spelled out a recommended set of rules or guidelines for its use. WARNOCK COMMITTEE
REPORT IN GREAT BRITIAN, UNITED KINGDOM, DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY,
1984, CMND. No. 9314 [hereinafter WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT]; ONTARIO LAW RE-
FORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND RELATED MAT-
TERS (1985); VICTORIA COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES
ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter WALLER
COMMITTEE]. In general, these reports would permit egg donation under the same condi-
tions applied for permitting sperm donation. This would require written consent before the
donation, a recipient who is married or in a stable relationship, counseling, a ban on pay-
ments, and provisions giving the offspring access to information about their parentage. All
of these reports recognize that intrafamilial donation might occur in some circumstances,
and would limit the number of children from one donor. Victoria, Australia also bans the
use of donor eggs or embryos from more than one source. None of the above mentioned
reports address the risk that might arise in donor recruitment.
Few continental countries have given egg donation attention. A French Ethics Com-
mittee Report implicitly approves it on the model of donor sperm. NATIONAL ETHICS CON-
SULTATIVE COMMITTEE FOR LIFE AND HEALTH SCIENCES, REPORT RELATIVE TO RESEARCH
WORK ON HUMAN EMBRYOS IN VITRO AND USE THEREOF FOR MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
PURPOSES 13 (1987).
The Council of Europe's Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical
Sciences (CAHBI) would permit egg donation but ban payments to donors, limit the num-
ber of donations, and ban surrogate embryo transfer. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, AD Hoc COM-
MITTEE OF EXPERTS ON PROGRESS IN THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 6-10 (1986). Interest-
ingly, the CAHBI would allow a donor to set certain nondiscriminatory conditions on who
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
freezing, egg donation appears to present fewer ethical problems.
The use of donor oocytes, however, does pose ethical issues
that deserve independent consideration. While some of these issues
also arise with donor sperm and other forms of collaborative re-
production, egg donation presents a novel twist because of its sep-
aration of female genetic and gestational parentage, and the rela-
tive scarcity and inaccessibility of oocytes. Thus, one set of issues
concerns the impact on offspring, on participants, and on the fam-
ily of rearing arrangements that separate female genetic and ges-
tational parentage. A second set of issues involves questions of
consent, risk and commodification in the procurement of eggs for
donation, and questions of ownership and manipulation of oocytes
and resulting embryos.
Overarching these issues is the larger question of procreative
liberty and the allocation of decisional authority between the pub-
lic and private sectors over use of a novel reproductive technique
such as egg donation. Are infertile couples, donors, and physicians
free to enter into egg donation arrangements without close state
scrutiny? Is public regulation desirable or permissible? The next
section addresses these issues.
III. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND THE STATE'S LIMITED POWER
TO REGULATE EGG DONATION
While many applaud the development of noncoital reproduc-
tive techniques, personal moral views lead others to condemn
them. Some persons believe that sex and reproduction are inextri-
cably linked, and object to the use of technologies that separate
the two. They may also hold a view of the nuclear family that
may be the recipient of donated eggs. Id. at 3.
Sweden has recommended against egg donation in all circumstances, but does not ap-
pear to have given the question close attention. Its only official report on reproductive tech-
nologies focused on IVF and AID, but, in passing, proposed that "egg donation should be
prohibited in Sweden." Paper prepared by Tor Sverne, Ministry of Justice, Sweden (June
1987)(prepared for Cambridge Conference on New Reproductive Technologies). Sweden's
reasons for banning egg donation are inconsistent with its support of IVF and other embryo
manipulations, and may represent an ill-considered position that will evolve with further
thought and reflection.
Israel also permits egg donation; however, it requires that the donor be unmarried.
This condition is intended to avoid complications under Jewish law that the child will be
the offspring of another married woman and thus be a bastard. Letter from Dean Amos
Shapira, Tel Aviv University (April 16, 1986); See Navot, supra note 19, at 807. This
policy had the effect of requiring egg donors to be women not undergoing IVF, since IVF
was only recently made available to unmarried women.
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rejects the use of gamete donors or surrogates. Indeed, the Roman
Catholic Church has taken a deontological view condemning all
forms of noncoital reproduction, and thus has urged that civil laws
be passed to ban them.26 While some liberal Catholic thinkers do
not object to IVF, GIFT, or artificial insemination with a married
couple's gametes, even they oppose gamete donation and surro-
gacy because of its interposition of a "third party" into the mari-
tal relation, and therefore would object to egg donation.27
Could or should such considerations play a role in developing
public policy or regulating noncoital reproductive techniques such
as egg donation? At bottom, the question raised is a constitutional
one: What should be the scope of private discretion over noncoital
means of forming families? As with many constitutional ques-
tions, this one may be rephrased in terms of the burden of proof
which the state must meet to limit private discretion over use of
these techniques. If the state need only meet a low threshold of
potential harm to regulate these techniques, then a great deal of
regulation, including restrictions based on moralistic concerns, will
be possible. On the other hand, if the state has the burden of
showing that substantial harm will occur, then considerably more
private discretion over use of these techniques will remain, with
empirical uncertainties resolved in favor of individual choice.
How is the state's burden of proof concerning noncoital re-
productive technologies to be determined? Of central importance
to the issue is the connection between these techniques and the
procreative and family privacy of infertile couples. Noncoital re-
production involving embryos or collaborating donors and surro-
gates enables infertile married couples to form families that are
biologically related to one, if not both, rearing partners. As such,
they would appear to deserve the same protection against state
restriction that coital reproduction by married couples would re-
ceive.28 Thus, the state should have the burden of proving that
26. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT
FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CER-
TAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY 25 (Feb. 22, 1987), reprinted in 16 ORIGINS 697, 708 (1987).
27. American Fertility Society, supra note 17, at 825 (dissenting statement of Father
Richard McCormick). McCormick thus agrees with the Vatican position that any third
party collaborative arrangement "violates the sanctity of marriage by bringing a third
party into the marital relation." See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
supra note 26, at 25. He distinguishes adoption, where a child already exists and rearing
must be provided, from deliberately creating a child by means of gamete donation, thus
risking harm to the child from the absent genetic mother or father.
28. The key point underlying the claim for a negative right against state interference
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particular noncoital techniques threaten substantial harm to off-
spring and participants if it is to limit their use in forming
families. 9
If coitally infertile married couples (and others accorded a
right of coital reproduction) 0 have the same liberty to choose
noncoital means of reproduction that fertile couples have to
reproduce coitally, then moral condemnation of the separation of
sex and reproduction and of new forms of families, or speculative
fears of a slippery slope, would not suffice to restrict such tech-
niques, since such views would not suffice to restrict coital repro-
duction, to ban abortion, or to suppress books. Only serious harm
with private sector reproductive decisions (it is not a claim for a positive right to state
financing or provision of the procedures in question) is that the needs and interests of
infertile couples in bearing, begetting, or parenting offspring are no less than those of
coitally fertile couples. Reproduction matters, not because of the coitus (though that has its
own independent importance) but because of what the coitus makes possible. Furthermore,
coital infertility does not render a couple inadequate as child rearers.
It follows that restrictions on noncoital reproduction by an infertile married couple
should be subject to the rigorous scrutiny that would apply to restrictions on coital repro-
duction, not a looser standard. The use of noncoital techniques, including the assistance of
willing collaborators, should thus be constitutionally protected. In other words, only serious
harm to the interests of others, which is not avoidable by less restrictive means, justifies
restriction, with the state having the burden of establishing the requisite degree of harm.
Since claiming a right to achieve what one cannot achieve physically might seem odd,
consider the analogous effect of blindness on the first amendment right to read books.
Surely a blind person has the same right to acquire information from books that a sighted
person has. The inability to read visually would not bar the person from using technological
means, such as braille or recordings, to acquire the information contained in the book.
Because receipt of the information in the book is what the first amendment protects, the
means by which the information is received whether by sight, braille, or auditory means,
does not itself determine the presence or absence of first amendment rights. Restrictions on
the use of braille, for example, should then be subject to the same scrutiny as restrictions
on publication of printed books if the restrictions prevented blind persons from reading
books. Technological aids to overcome physical disability may implicate different state in-
terests, but they do not diminish the importance of the end being sought. See generally,
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 939, 957-62 (1987).
29. Unfortunately, advocates of regulation have often ignored or misunderstood the
implications that procreative liberty has on public policy regarding noncoital reproduction,
as is evidenced by the New Jersey Supreme Court's handling of procreative liberty argu-
ments in the Baby M case. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 447, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253
(1988) (stating that the constitutionally protected right of procreation does not encompass a
right to custody of the resulting offspring). For a critique of their reasoning, see Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof in Regulating Noncoital Reproduc-
tion, 16 L. ME. & HEALTH CARE 18, 23-24 (1988).
30. The right to reproduce coitally or noncoitally is strongest when a married couple
seeks to form a family. However, if unmarried persons also have a right to reproduce
coitally, then they would have an equivalent right to use noncoital means as well, at least if
coital means were ineffective. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 962-64.
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to the interests of others, not avoidable by less restrictive means,
should justify interference with a couple's reproductive decisions.
In general, the state will be limited in imposing restrictions based
on moralistic or symbolic concerns aside from actual harm.
With regard to egg donation, it should be clear that a total
ban on all forms of the technique would interfere with the procre-
ative liberty of infertile couples, just as a ban on donor sperm or
IVF would. Moralistic condemnation of the practice alone would
not constitute a compelling state interest, for actual harm to per-
sons--other than harm to their moral views--could not be shown.
Nor would speculative fears of an adverse impact on offspring or
family justify substantial restrictions on access to egg donation.
A similar burden of proof should apply if the state regulates,
rather than prohibits, egg donation by restricting multiple dona-
tions, intrafamilial donations, donations by lavage, payments to
egg donors, or the rearing arrangements that willing donors and
couples may enter."' To the extent that such restrictions signifi-
cantly restrict access to donor eggs, they should be tested by the
"compelling state interest" standard that would be applied to re-
strictions on coital reproduction.
Assuming these constitutional boundaries for state regulation,
the remaining sections discuss the main concerns that have arisen
with regard to egg donation: the welfare of offspring, the effect on
family and rearing arrangements, and donor recruitment.
IV. EGG DONATION AND THE WELFARE OF OFFSPRING
A major concern with noncoital reproduction, especially with
third party assistance in the formation of families, is the resulting
impact on offspring. If birth through noncoital techniques harmed
offspring, then the argument for banning their use and relegating
infertile couples to the adoption market might have greater
weight.32 Gamete donation and surrogacy are thought to be prob-
lematic for offspring because of the risk that children will be con-
fused or bewildered by the separation of genetic, gestational, and
rearing parentage, and the resulting rearing conflicts that might
31. A state interested in regulating egg donation might restrict all or some of the
listed practices.
32. It is not clear that the risk of harm to offspring would be a compelling argument*
against use of the technique, since the offspring in question would not exist but for the
allegedly harmful technique. See infra note 38.
1988-891
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ensue.33
Yet some forms of collaborative reproduction are now widely
accepted. For example, the risks to children from adoption and
artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID) appear to be ac-
ceptable. The standard adoption situation differs from AID, be-
cause the separation of parentage occurs after a child is born and
in need of rearing parents. The use of AID has also gained accept-
ance since the deliberate separation of male genetic and social
parentage through sperm donation has not been shown to produce
greater pathology for offspring or their families.34 There is little
reason to think that egg donation would pose any greater
problems than those posed by adoption and AID, and many
grounds for thinking that it would pose less.
A. Is Separation of Female Genetic and Gestational Parentage
Unethical Because It Is Harmful to Offspring?
There is no reason to expect problems to arise for offspring
from egg donation that would challenge its ethical acceptability
and justify prohibition of the practice. The child will have a bio-
logical genetic link with the rearing father and a biological gesta-
tional link with the rearing mother, as occurs in coital conception
and in IVF or GIFT with husband and wife gametes. Only the
lack of a genetic tie between the gestational, rearing mother and
the offspring (and lack of rearing by the genetic mother) distin-
guishes noncoital reproduction with donor eggs from children who
are coitally conceived. 35
In fact, egg donation creates a more stable rearing and fam-
ily situation than exists in any other collaborative reproductive ar-
rangement, since the gestating and rearing mother are the same.
Unlike sperm donation, where the partner lacking gametes has no
biological relation with the offspring, the recipient of an egg dona-
tion gestates and gives birth, thus having a biological as well as a
33. The risk of physical injury to offspring from donor oocytes is comparable to the
risks of IVF, and is considered minimal. Thus, if donor oocytes result in a pregnancy,
physical harm to offspring is unlikely. Therefore, egg donation could not be banned on that
basis. See infra note 38.
34. R. SNOWDEN, G. MITCHELL & E. SNOWDEN, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A So-
CIAL INVESTIGATION 50-54, 71-82, 97-104 (1983). The data is not yet in on surrogacy, but
preliminary indications are that it should have advantages over adoption, since the rearing
father will also be the genetic father.
35. If the egg source is a family member, then the gestational mother will have a
familial genetic tie with the offspring.
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rearing relationship with the offspring. The danger that the recipi-
ent will view the child as "not hers," which could occur with hus-
bands in sperm donation, does not exist with egg donation.
Egg donation is also preferable to adoption or embryo dona-
tion, because each rearing parent will have either a genetic or ges-
tational connection to the offspring. In embryo donation, neither
parent is genetically connected with the offspring, even though the
rearing female will have gestated. With adoption, neither rearing
parent has a biological connection with the offspring.
Egg donation also appears preferable to full or partial surro-
gacy. Unless the genetic tie is deemed all-important, egg donation
is more attractive for offspring than full gestational surrogacy,
since the rearing mother will also have gestated, though she will
lack the genetic tie. 6 In contrast, offspring of a full gestational
surrogate will be raised by a mother to whom they are genetically
related but who did not bear them. With partial surrogacy (in
which the surrogate provides the egg and gestation), the rearing
mother will not even have a genetic tie with the offspring.
Is it reasonable to assume that the gestational connection to
the rearing mother will count for more than genetic similarity and
the missing genetic mother? One cannot easily ignore the impor-
tance which genetic or bloodline connections have traditionally
held, especially in patriarchal societies. Still, female reproduction
is traditionally so closely associated with gestation that the gesta-
tional mother who rears is likely to be more important for the
offspring and society than the woman who provides the egg. Thus,
it is neither unreasonable nor necessarily sexist to think that ge-
netic or bloodline connections will be of lesser importance for
women and offspring than gestational connections, even if men
would still place a premium on having genetic heirs. 7 Of course,
the genetic tie may still have meaning for donors and offspring,
though a meaning less than that of gestational and rearing
parentage.
In sum, the deliberate separation of female genetic and gesta-
tional parentage that occurs in egg donation appears to pose the
36. Unless the egg donor is a family member, in which case, the offspring will also
have a familial genetic tie.
37. Some feminists have argued that bloodline connections or genetic ties should
have no special importance for men or women. However, one may wonder whether atti-
tudes toward the genetic bond would vary depending on the sex of the gamete donor and
the resulting offspring.
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least risk of family conflict or psychosocial confusion for offspring.
Offspring are not harmed merely by being born to, and reared by,
a woman who is not the genetic mother. Indeed, the procedure
makes their very birth possible, since they would not have existed
aside from the donation."8
Given the advantages of egg donation over other forms of col-
laborative reproduction, it should be obvious that the ethical or
legal case for banning all egg donation to protect offspring is very
weak. A legal ban on egg donation would interfere with the pro-
creative liberty of infertile couples to form a family biologically
related to both partners.39 Moralistic condemnation unrelated to
actual harm to offspring would not provide the compelling state
interest necessary to justify interference with the couple's funda-
mental right to form families.40 Thus, egg donation could not con-
stitutionally be banned to protect offspring from the speculative
harm of confused lineage.
B. Anonymity and Relations Between Offspring and Donor
Following the model of donor sperm, most egg donations will
probably be made anonymously, and donor records may not even
be kept. Yet offspring born of donor eggs might wish to gain in-
formation about their genetic mother. Must they be told of the
egg donation? Do they have a right to know or meet their genetic
mother? To find an answer to these questions, we must consider
the importance of the female genetic tie tout court for offspring
and donors.
The central inquiry concerns the importance of a relationship
with, or knowledge of, genetic parents who have not gestated or
reared. Some adopted children have strong desires to learn about
38. Even if psychosocial complications were more frequent than in offspring con-
ceived coitally by a married couple, it would still be difficult to show that the offspring, who
cannot exist aside from the collaborative arrangement at issue, would be so harmed by
existence that their lives would be "wrongful." Therefore, the technique could not be
banned to protect offspring. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 988 n.169. This point holds
true even if persons find that collaborative reproduction involving donor gametes, donor
embryos, and surrogacy "harms" the child, since the harm will still be less than the degree
of harm necessary to make the life "wrongful."
39. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. See also Robertson, supra note
28, at 958-62.
40. Robertson, supra note 28, at 966 (stating that symbolic concerns without direct
harm to others are usually insufficient to justify infringing the fundamental rights of per-
sons with different views).
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or meet their biological parents.41 Children of sperm donation oc-
casionally share this desire as well. It is likely that children born
of surrogacy will also want to meet their gestational (and genetic)
mother. However, it is not clear that egg donation will inspire the
same drive for knowing the genetic parent, since offspring may not
experience the sense of abandonment that is often felt with adop-
tion and possibly with surrogacy.
For many persons the gestational and rearing role of the re-
cipient of donor eggs will dwarf the importance of the female ge-
netic tie tout court. Its importance may vary with the individuals
involved and their own reproductive, life, and family experiences.
It may be of little or no importance to many offspring, donors, and
recipients, even if it matters greatly to others. Further experience
will be necessary to fully assess this issue.
In any event, one might argue that there is an ethical obliga-
tion to inform the child that he or she was born of a donor egg,
and to provide relevant genetic or other information, at least if the
offspring desires it. This information is basic to self-identity, and
is as much a part of the self as is one's name. It may be important
for health reasons as well. Advisory commissions have generally
supported such a right, yet it is still a hotly contested issue."2
A variation on this problem arises with the rule recom-
mended by some commissions, and adopted in Victoria, Australia,
that eggs or embryos from different donors may not be transferred
to the uterus of the recipient at the same time.43 Presumably, this
rule seeks to avoid confusion about the identity of the genetic par-
ent. However, if this procedure were more efficient in producing
offspring, and other means of establishing genetic parentage ex-
isted, the practice should be acceptable.
At present, in most jurisdictions, offspring of egg donation
would not have a legal right to learn information about, much less
41. See B. LIFTON, TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER (1975).
42. See sources cited supra note 25. Sweden now requires that all sperm donors be
identified so that the identity of the donor as well as other information can be provided to
offspring. Several commissions have recommended that offspring of donor sperm and eggs
should be given information concerning the genetic parent. See paper prepared by Tor
Sverne, Ministry of Justice, Sweden (June 1987)(prepared for Cambridge Conference on
New Reproductive Technologies).
43. See WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note 25. See also Infertility (Medical Proce-
dures) Act, Act No. 10,163, § 13(3) (Vict. [Aus.] 1984)(stating that "[a] procedure ...
shall not be carried out unless . . . (e) where more than one embryo is used in the proce-
dure, the gametes from which each embryo was derived were produced by the same two
persons.").
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the identity of, the genetic mother, even if records of such infor-
mation existed. In the United States, adopted children and chil-
dren born of sperm donation generally do not have a legal right to
override pledges of confidentiality to learn their biological ori-
gins.44 Great Britain and Australia have become more liberal on
this score, however, and are likely to extend this protection to chil-
dren born of donor eggs. 45
A strong ethical argument in favor of such laws might be
made, although counterarguments do exist. Legislation requiring
that information about the donor be made available to offspring
might interfere with the wishes of the infertile couple and donor
regarding privacy, and may deter persons from volunteering as do-
nors or seeking egg donations. Yet one might reasonably conclude
that the offspring's interest in personal and genetic identity out-
weighs the privacy interests of donors and recipients.4" Whether
restrictions on donor anonymity would dry up the donor pool or
merely alter its characteristics must await further experience.4 7
The needs of offspring to know about their origin may justly take
priority over donor and recipient wishes for privacy, even if it al-
ters the pool of egg donors and prevents the birth of some children
who would otherwise have been born.48
Until such laws are passed, however, egg donor programs
should keep records so that access at a later time could be pro-
vided if offspring became entitled to such information. Of course,
donors and recipient couples must be informed that such confiden-
tial records are being kept. Even if disclosure were not legally re-
quired, the parties could consent to release of information to those
offspring interested in acquiring it.
44. Robertson, supra note 28, at 1016-17.
45. See supra note 25. Sweden also requires that the name of the sperm donor be
registered and information provided to those offspring above eighteen years of age who
desire it.
46. Robertson, supra note 28, at 1017-18. The offspring's interest in obtaining infor-
mation about his genetic identity would be deemed a compelling state interest that would
justify the intrusion imposed on the donor and recipient's wishes and privacy.
47. Scotland and other jurisdictions which make this information available to
adopted children report that only a small minority of children ever seek it.
48. Unborn persons have no right to be born, and thus no person whose rights this
policy could violate will ever exist. See Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93 (1982).
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V. ASSIGNMENT OF REARING RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN
OFFSPRING OF EGG DONATION
An important set of ethical, legal, and policy issues concerns
the respective rearing rights and duties of the donor and recipient
couple in offspring born of egg donation. Since all three contribute
to the birth of the child, all three could have an interest in rearing
the offspring. For example, the egg donor may have a strong inter-
est in knowing or participating in the rearing of the child (as may
the child in knowing and relating to the genetic mother) .4 At the
same time, the recipient couple (and/or child) may have an inter-
est in the donor being excluded altogether, or in contributing sup-
port or other services to the rearing of the offspring.
In this situation, disputes about custody, support, visitation,
and inheritance are likely to be painful for the parties and damag-
ing to the offspring. Uncertainty about legal consequences may
also deter infertile couples and donors from using this procreative
option. As a result, rules that clearly define the social parentage
and status of children born of egg donation (and other collabora-
tive arrangements) are needed.
A far-sighted jurisdiction would reduce uncertainty and facil-
itate such arrangments with legislation that specifies rearing
rights and duties in offspring born of egg donations." A basic
question for legislators is whether the child's status will be deter-
mined by a contractual agreement among the parties or controlled
by a legislative prescription of rearing rights and duties. 51 Given
the experience with donor sperm, it is likely that legislation would
recognize the donor's relinquishment of rearing rights and duties
49. Some sperm donors have attempted to contact their offspring. It is logical to
assume that egg donors might want information about their genetic offspring.
50. For an example of a model act accomplishing much of this goal (but not recog-
nizing agreements to have the donor participate in rearing) See CHILDREN OF THE NEw
BIOLOGY ACT (Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1988). Legis-
lating might present a dilemma, due to the symbolic legitimation and encouragement
which legislation appears to give to practices that some persons view as morally and so-
cially questionable. On the other hand, failure to legislate may prevent access to infertility
treatments and lead to disruptive disputes or uncertainty about legal results.
51. The most desirable legislative solution would be to recognize those results that
the parties reach contractually, such as an agreement to exclude the donor from any rear-
ing responsibility. Indeed, a failure to recognize such contracts might interfere with the
procreative liberty of the parties, unless a compelling governmental interest would justify
the interference. Interfering to assure that the rearing party is a good child rearer, or that
support is otherwise provided, might be adequate, but only if a similar interference could
occur with offspring of coital reproduction.
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and their assumption by the recipient couple. Even without legis-
lation it is reasonable to conclude that courts will uphold agree-
ments for assigning all rearing rights and duties to the gestational
rather than the genetic mother, a result that parallels family rela-
tions with sperm donation. Depending upon their impact on off-
spring, agreements to share rearing among donor, gestational
mother, and biological father may also be recognized.
A. Agreements to Exclude the Donor
In the United States and other Anglo-American jurisdictions,
courts and legislatures are likely to recognize an agreement that
totally excludes the egg donor and transfers all rearing rights and
duties in the offspring to the recipient who gestates, in the event of
disputes over custody, support, visitation, and inheritance. The
rearing or legal mother has traditionally been the gestational
mother. If the gestational mother (and the partner providing the
sperm) had originally bargained to rear the offspring, there is no
reason why they should not be held to their bargain.52 The donor's
right to participate in rearing, after providing the egg under the
condition that she be excluded, seems of lesser merit, even if sur-
rogate mothers are permitted to change their minds and rear the
child intended for the hiring couple after birth.5
Such a result would parallel the assignment of rearing rights
and duties in offspring born of donor insemination consented to by
the recipient's husband. The donor's relinquishment, and the hus-
band's assumption, of rearing rights and duties in the offspring is
recognized by statute in thirty states and in many countries.54
52. For inheritance purposes, the child would take from the gestational mother in the
following ways: as her heir under intestacy statutes, or as a devisee when bequests are left
to her "issue" or to her "heirs," or to "issue or heirs" of the gestational mother and her
husband. The child should have no right then to take from the genetic mother, unless the
genetic mother expressly provides that the offspring should take from her.
53. Even if surrogates are permitted the right to change their minds and rear off-
spring that they were hired to produce for an infertile couple, the gamete donor-who has
only a genetic and not gestational tie with the offspring-would not have as strong a claim
as the surrogate to override the preconception agreement to relinquish rearing rights and
duties. Society may choose to value the gestational bond more highly than the genetic
bond.
54. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 242-44. While all thirty
existing statutes specify that the consenting husband is the legal father for all legal pur-
poses, only sixteen states say that the donor is not the father. A reasonable interpretation in
the other fourteen states, which do not specifically exclude the donor from any paternal
role, is that the specification of the husband as the father effectively excludes the donor.
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This rule has even been followed in states without statutes ad-
dressing the subject. 55 There is no apparent reason why the same
result should not be reached with donor eggs when the parties
have specifically agreed to that arrangement.56
It should be noted that the recipient's partner (the source of
the sperm) is the legal father, with all attendant rearing rights
and duties, as long as he has knowingly provided sperm with the
intention of fathering a child that he will rear.57 Under the rules
that usually apply to sperm donated to a married couple in which
the husband consents to the donation, the man donating sperm so
that others may rear would have no rearing rights or duties in
resulting offspring.
Similarly, the spouse of the egg donor would have no rights
or duties in offspring born of his wife's donated egg. The rule
making the husband the presumptive father of children born of his
wife assumes that she has gestated and will rear the child.58 Such
a rule should not make him responsible for his wife's genetic off-
spring that have been gestated and reared by another woman and
fathered by another man. Nor would a husband have the power to
prevent his wife from donating eggs anymore than he could pre-
vent her from aborting or going to term, or than his wife could
prevent him from donating sperm to infertile couples. 59 To prevent
55. People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968)(de-
fendant, although sterile, was the lawful father and was therefore obliged to support a child
born to his wife by a process of heterologous artificial insemination); In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1973) (adoption of a child
born after artificial insemination of wife by semen of third-party donor requires husband's
consent, since he is considered "a parent").
56. Victoria, Australia, which has the only existing statute on egg donation, subjects
the egg donor to the same rights and duties that the sperm donor has. See Infertility (Med-
ical Procedures) Act, Act No. 10,163, § 13 (Vict. [Aus] 1984). By implication this statute
does not permit the parties to bargain for some legally enforcible later contact between
donor and offspring.
57. In most states, if a married woman receives a donor embryo without her hus-
band's consent and gives birth to a child during the period of their marriage, the child
would be presumed (often irrebuttably) to be the legitimate child of the father. Artificial
insemination laws requiring husband consent for him to be the legitimate and legal father
might not apply, since in vitro insemination of a donor egg with donor sperm might not be
held to be "artificial insemination" as used in those statutes, since the conception occurs in
vitro rather than in vivo.
58. However, this is not so where the child is the result of artificial insemination by
donor sperm, and the husband has not consented to the procedure. See Freed, As Surro-
gate Parenting Increases States Must Resolve Legal Issues, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 22, 1986, at
10, col. I.
59. If the husband has no legal responsibility for the genetic offspring of his wife
who are gestated and reared by another woman, he would have no interest in the avoidance
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disputes, however, written consent of the donor's spouse may be
requested, though it should not be obligatory.
B. Agreements to Include the Donor in Rearing
The typical case of egg donation envisions the donor relin-
quishing, and the recipient acquiring, all rearing rights and duties
in the offspring. However, depending on demographic and social
change and the supply of egg donors, some women may volunteer
as donors only on the condition that they participate in rearing.
This arrangement might occur among friends, in intrafamilial do-
nations, or even in cases of strangers who donate without being
paid. 0 Should such collaborative rearing arrangements be permit-
ted? Should they be legally enforced, if either the recipient or the
donor later violates them?
The position most protective of procreative liberty and family
privacy would not prohibit parties from entering into such collabo-
rative rearing arrangements if they saw fit. Many types of blended
and extended family rearing relations exist even in western cul-
tures. They are not necessarily harmful, and may have positive
benefits for all parties.
A more serious legal question arises when either the donor or
recipient wishes to violate the agreement for the egg donor to par-
ticipate in rearing. Respect for procreative liberty and family pri-
vacy would recognize the right to enter into such collaborative re-
productive arrangements and have them enforced against both
donors or recipients if either violates them. Recipients would then
be obligated to permit the donor to have some contact with the
child, unless such contact were harmful." The donor's claim to
of such offspring that would deserve legal protection. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)(holding that a state cannot grant a husband the right to
prevent or veto an abortion). On the other hand, Victoria, Australia requires the husband's
consent to ovum donation. See Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, Act No. 10,163, §
13(3)(b) (Vict. [Aus.] 1984).
60. If the agreement is that the egg donor is to be the primary or sole rearer, then
the situation is that of gestational surrogacy, and the rules for enforcing surrogate con-
tracts would apply. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)(suggesting that the
agreement to exclude the gestational mother or surrogate would not be enforced).
61. A claim that legal enforcement of such agreements is constitutionally required
would have to rest on the argument that a person's procreative liberty includes the right to
provide genetic material and participate in rearing the resulting offspring, unless harm to
the offspring would result. This claim is broader than the procreative liberty claimed for
married couples, and may not be as easily recognized by the courts. See supra notes 28-30
and accompanying text. The claim might be stronger if viewed as derivative of the infertile
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rear would be strongest if some rearing relation with the offspring
had been permitted to occur. 2 It would be weakest if she sought
to participate in rearing long after the child was born.63
Similarly, an egg donor who had explicitly agreed to assume
rearing obligations might be obligated to pay support or assume
custody to protect the best interests of the child or to bear a fair
share of rearing burdens. In situations not covered by statute,
there is the danger that courts might impose rearing obligations
on egg donors who did not wish them, just as it has done with
biological fathers, including those who have never reared or even
intended to conceive offspring.64 In the paternity cases, however,
no other biological father is available. With egg donation, a gesta-
tional rearing mother exists, so that the need to hold the genetic
mother accountable, despite her wishes to the contrary, is less
compelling.
While disputes between egg donor and recipient may be too
infrequent to pose major problems, they are discussed here to
show the kinds of disputes that might arise when gametes are ex-
changed through egg donation. Further legal and ethical consider-
ation of such agreements must await future experience.6"
married couple's right to obtain egg donations. By permitting a particular couple to renege
on their agreement to allow the donor to participate in rearing would arguably interfere
with the ability of other infertile couples to obtain eggs, because it would deter donors from
giving eggs on that basis.
If the right to enter into such agreements were recognized, a question would still re-
main as to whether state interests justify overriding that right. Thus the question would be
whether having two female rearing parents would be harmful in infancy and childhood. If
a child's best interests would be served by having only one female parent, then the agree-
ment might be overidden, presumably in favor of the gestational mother, sirnce it was
planned that she would rear anyway.
62. Even persons who are not genetically related may acquire visitation rights from
post-birth participation in a rearing role. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at A44, col. 1.
63. Biological parents who avoid any rearing role can have parental rights flowing
from the genetic relationship terminated. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
64. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986)(holding that semen donor's status as legal father is preserved where semen is not
obtained by recipient through a licensed physician, leading to a valid support order against
the donor). For an example of a court imposing child support payment on a man who had
been assured by the woman that pregnancy could not result from the act of intercourse, see
In re Pamela P., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
65. Even if one is persuaded that the interests of the offspring are best served by not
recognizing the donor's claims (the child does have a gestational mother here, unlike the
sperm donor situation where there may be no male parent), this conclusion would apply
only to a case where the donor and recipient sought a variation on the standard egg dona-
tion arrangement, since the right to relinquish all rearing rights and duties to the recipient
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VI. INTRAFAMILIAL DONATIONS
Intrafamilial donations may be sought for the purpose of hav-
ing a genetic tie with offspring, for cultural reasons, to reduce
costs, or because of a preference for a known donor.
Indeed, intrafamilial donations may be more desirable for off-
spring and families. The relationship between a familial egg donor
and offspring may lead to a special aunt or godmother-type rear-
ing relationship that all find mutually satisfying. On the other
hand, family conflict could arise and project itself into the rela-
tions among donor, recipient, and offspring.
Equally complicated blended family arrangements exist in
many cultures. The levirate custom of a brother marrying a
brother's widow and fathering more children, who are then half-
siblings and cousins, is widely recognized. In the west, marriages
of persons with children from previous marriages with step and
biological children reared in the same family unit are now fre-
quent. Viewed in this larger context, intrafamilial egg donation
should not be alarming.
It is surprising that some official or quasi-official bodies have
recommended that family or friends not be used as gamete donors.
The Voluntary Licensing Authority in the United Kingdom will
not license an IVF clinic that accepts the recipient's sister as an
oocyte donor, out of fear that close familial ties might have harm-
ful psychological consequences on offspring.6 6 Victoria, Australia,
and New South Wales also ban such donations."'
Given that the recipient and donor will share a genetic con-
nection with the child, the benefits of intrafamilial donation may
clearly outweigh any harm. It may be that there are distinct ad-
vantages in such a relationship, akin psychosocially to the immu-
nological advantages of intrafamilial organ and tissue donation.
Since the fear of harm to offspring is currently speculative, a ban
on intrafamilial egg donations is premature, and should await evi-
dence of actual harm. 8 In the United States a governmental ban
would still exist.
66. Voluntary Licensing Authority for Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryol-
ogy, Second Report, at 8 (1987).
67. Compare these statutes with the recommendation of South Australia's Working
Party on In Vitro Fertilization and Artificial Insemination by Donor, Report at 28 (1984)
that relatives, friends, or known persons not be used as gamete donors in AID or IVF.
68. A somewhat similar problem arises when the donor is known to the recipient, or
has been recruited by her. This knowledge, however, may turn out to be beneficial for all
parties, or may lead to later complications.
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on intrafamilial gamete donations would raise serious constitu-
tional problems.6"
VII. EGG SUPPLY AND DONOR RECRUITMENT ISSUES
Egg donation requires that women willing to provide healthy
eggs be identified, and the eggs retrieved, so that an embryo,
formed from the donor oocyte and the recipient's partner's sperm,
implants in the recipient's uterus. Since retrievable eggs are fewer
than donor sperm and relatively inaccessible, egg retrieval poses
issues of risk and ownership that do not arise so clearly in sperm
donation. Although parallels exist in other bioethical contexts,
these issues arise with a unique spin in egg donation.
In broad terms, the issues raised by donor recruitment impli-
cate concerns about paternalism and commodification of the body
and its products. Paternalism concerns arise out of the bodily and
physical risks which egg donors undertake for the sake of others,
an issue common to many bioethical questions, including refusal
of necessary treatment, serving as a surrogate mother, and live
donation of organs or tissue for transplant. Commodification con-
cerns arise when a woman donates eggs for money, thus turning
her body and its products into a commodity for sale, an issue also
arising with paid surrogacy and the buying and selling of organs.
Paternalism and commodification take on added meaning in a re-
productive context, due to the dangers of exploiting women and
the symbolic significance of reproductive factors. 0
Three donor situations need to be distinguished: 1) women
undergoing IVF treatment; 2) women undergoing other surgery;
and 3) women recruited specifically for egg donation. Donors in
each group might be anonymous strangers or friends or relatives
recruited by the recipient.71 In each instance, the donors will have
69. Such a ban would arguably interfere with the couple's procreative liberty or fam-
ily privacy by denying them the means necessary to reproduce. However, if alternative egg
sources were available to the couple a court may be less likely to find a violation of procre-
ative liberty, unless the selection of the genetic source were also considered part of that
right. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
70. Some feminists have been concerned that women will come to be viewed as "egg
producers" without regard to their interests or welfare. Corea, Egg Snatchers, in TEST-
TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 37-52 (1984); Murphy, Egg Farming
and Women's Future, in TFST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 76-92
(1984). To minimize the danger to donors, it is essential that the free, informed choice of
potential donors is respected.
71. The following discussion assumes, unless otherwise indicated, that the donor is a
stranger.
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to be screened medically and genetically, and their free, informed
consent to the donation assured.
A. Donors Undergoing IVF Treatment
Some donor egg programs will obtain eggs from women who
are undergoing hyperstimulation and oocyte retrieval as part of
their own IVF treatment. Hyperstimulation regimens often pro-
duce ten or more eggs-more than can be safely transferred after
insemination to the egg source. Eggs that could not be insemi-
nated and safely transferred to the uterus can be retrieved and
donated to women unable to produce healthy eggs. The donated
eggs could be transferred soon after insemination or frozen after
insemination for transfer at a later time. The largest IVF program
in the United States, the Jones Institute, in Norfolk, Virginia,
uses this method of obtaining donor eggs. 2
While this source is the least risky for the donor, it may not
provide sufficient donor eggs to meet the demand. Many couples
undergoing IVF might prefer to inseminate and freeze extra eggs
rather than donate them, thus limiting the supply of donor ova.
Also, unless randomly selected, excess oocytes obtained from IVF
patients may be morphologically less desirable than those oocytes
chosen for insemination and transfer to the donor. On the other
hand, random selection of donor ova risks lowering the donor's
own chances of pregnancy while increasing those of the recipient.
Finally, this pool of donors may be too small to permit close
matching of donor and recipient characteristics.
Despite these disadvantages, donors who are themselves un-
dergoing stimulation and retrieval of eggs for IVF present mini-
mal ethical concerns. The primary risk encountered in such a pro-
gram is that the eggs they donate might lead to pregnancy while
the ones they retain for their own use do not. Surely this is the
sort of risk that consenting adults are permitted to run in our soci-
ety, even if eggs are selected randomly rather than reserving the
best ones for the donor's own attempts at pregnancy. As long as
full disclosure and consent occurs, the risk to the donor of not
achieving pregnancy is not a serious ethical objection to
donation. 3
72. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73. Indeed, the greatest ethical concern may be that the recipient is not being given
access to the best eggs available, and thus may be undergoing the costs and burdens of a
procedure that has a very small chance of achieving pregnancy. Informed consent of the
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B. Donors Undergoing Other Medical Procedures
A second source of donors includes women who are undergo-
ing tubal ligation or other abdominal surgery which gives easy ac-
cess to the ovaries. While this source has the advantage of impos-
ing little surgical risk on the donor beyond some slight
lengthening of the surgical procedure, it would entail scheduling
inconvenience and the risks of ovarian hyperstimulation. 4 The
stimulation and surgery could be timed to coincide with transfer
to the recipient, but freezing of inseminated eggs is probably the
best way to synchronize the procedure with the recipient's cycle.
Consenting donors who are undergoing other abdominal pro-
cedures also present little ethical concern. The risk of hyperstimu-
lation and some slight lengthening of their surgery would seem to
be well within the discretion of individuals who knowingly consent
to such a procedure.
However, it is unclear whether enough eggs to meet future
demand can be obtained from this source, and whether sufficient
flexibility for matching recipients will exist. There also may be
logistic or other problems that limit the eggs that will be available
from women undergoing abdominal surgery.
C. Donors Not Undergoing Medical Procedures
Donors experiencing the greatest risks, and hence posing the
greatest ethical problems, are women recruited specifically for egg
donation. They are asked to submit to hyperstimulation and re-
moval or retrieval by lavage after in vivo insemination solely to
donate eggs. The advantage of utilizing this source is the possibil-
ity of a more reliable and predictable pool of donors, and thus a
larger and more certain supply of eggs for donation. Given the
limitations of other egg sources and the logistic and selection ad-
vantages which it offers, this group is likely to be the largest
source of donor eggs.
The disadvantage is that women will be undergoing more
than a minimal risk in order to benefit others, and may require
recipient mitigates, but does not eliminate, this ethical problem.
74. The risks posed by the hormones employed in hyperstimulation, mainly Pergonal
and Clomid, are generally considered minimal. However, complications can occur. The
ovaries might enlarge excessively and ovarian cysts may rupture causing an acute emer-
gency requiring hospitalization. Rupture resulting in hospitalization may occur in one-half
to one percent of hyperstimulated women. See Formigli; supra note 16, at 1442;
Rosenwaks, supra note 6, at 898-99.
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payment for their efforts.7 5 Most donors will undergo laparoscopy
under general anesthesia after ovarian stimulation to donate eggs.
While ultrasound-guided transvaginal aspiration of eggs will re-
duce some of these risks, general anesthesia may still be em-
ployed, and complications from the retrieval process are possible.
Donors of in vivo inseminated eggs removed by lavage run the risk
of normal or ectopic pregnancy, and the ensuing medical treat-
ment, abortion, or childbirth to which they may lead.76
Although the risks involved are greater than those faced by
the sperm donor or other egg sources, they seem to be within the
realm of personal choice, assuming informed and free consent by
the donor. While not insignificant, the risks of stimulation and
surgical or lavage retrieval appear to be moderate. Their choice
would seem rational and within the scope of ordinary adult discre-
tion, or so reasonable persons might think, who find value to do-
nor, recipient, and offspring in egg donation.
Bone marrow or kidney donation provides a useful compari-
son for assessing the acceptability of the level of risk involved.
Both kidney and bone marrow donations involve risks greater than
egg donation. Yet society approves of, and even encourages kidney
and bone marrow donations by living donors, including marrow
donations from unrelated donors, even though they will be re-
quired to undergo surgery and general anesthesia."
While marrow and kidney donors experience comparable or
greater risks than egg donors, the benefits to the recipients differ.
Marrow and organ transplants from living donors are usually per-
formed to save life or remove dependency on dialysis. Egg dona-
tion, however, is not life-saving. Its purpose is to relieve infertility,
allow genetic selection to occur, or provide eggs for diagnostic and
research uses. Still, reasonable persons might find these goals to
be sufficiently important to justify voluntary assumption of the
75. See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text. In addition, a program dependent
on this source will face the need to advertise and solve other logistic problems in recruiting
donors from the community at large.
76. Egg donation by lavage also raises issues of embryo status and control, since a
preimplantation embryo is the vehicle by which the egg donation occurs. See supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
77. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 granted authority to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of a national
bone marrow registry and to establish the registry within six months of the completion of
the study. The registry would be created to match unknown and related persons for mar-
row donations. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (1986).
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risks of egg donation.78 Donors are not frivolously risking such
great injury to themselves that interference with their choice and
the reproductive needs of infertile couples could be justified
merely to protect their welfare. Indeed, such paternalistic interfer-
ence with reproductive choice would probably be held
unconstitutional.7 9
D. Repeat Egg Donations
Repeat donors may be attractive to IVF programs interested
in building up a reliable pool of fertile donors, even though they
complicate the ethical analysis because of the increased risks to
donors. At some point multiple donations by women recruited for
that purpose might become ethically unacceptable due to the ac-
cumulated risks involved.
As a practical matter, it may be that few programs or donors
will even consider repeat donations from women not undergoing
IVF or surgery.80 Programs should consider limiting the number
of times a donor may be used because of uncertainty over accepta-
78. Some egg donors may be partially or wholly motivated by money payments
which, under federal law, are not available to organ and tissue donors. On the other hand,
like organ and tissue donors, many oocyte donors will be acting altruistically. To illustrate,
women undergoing IVF who donate excess eggs, women undergoing abdominal surgery
who agree to be stimulated in order to provide donor eggs, and related or unrelated women
who undergo stimulation and surgery solely to donate may all be motivated largely by the
desire to help relieve the infertility of those unable to produce their own healthy oocytes.
Even women who are paid for procedures that they would not otherwise undergo may be
strongly motivated by the desire to help infertile couples. In addition, egg donors may also
have procreative goals that do not exist with marrow and kidney donors. Some women may
donate eggs as a way of reproducing without the burdens of gestation or rearing (perhaps a
similar motivation exists with sperm donors). They may also be motivated by egoism, or
the simple desire to leave a legacy of children to the world. For example, an egg donor
testified before Congress, "I have good genes and want to pass them on." See Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1984).
79. Since infertile couples would have a right to use donor eggs to form a family, a
limit on supply that would interfere significantly with access to donor eggs would have to
be justified by a compelling state interest. The risk to the donor may not be a sufficiently
compelling state interest, given that similar risks are permitted to people in many circum-
stances. Arguably, fears of commodification or exploitation of donors would also not justify
interference with procreative liberty. See Robertson, supra note 28, at 966, 1018-23.
80. Repeat donations would most likely occur when egg donation occurs by lavage,
rather than by surgical removal. Dr. John Buster's program of oocyte donation by lavage
had envisioned women going through the donor cycle many times. See Bustillo, supra note
16. Although the donor risks ectopic or normal pregnancy, retrieval is nonsurgical and may
be more easily accepted by donors and sought by programs offering this form of egg dona-
tion. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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bility of the risks involved. A limit of three to five cycles would
appear to strike a reasonable balance. Such a limit is unlikely to
increase the scarcity of donor oocytes, and can always be reconsid-
ered after more experience develops."'
Another possibility occurring with repeat donations is the
chance that one donor will provide the eggs that lead to the birth
of many children resulting in unwitting consanguineous marriages.
However, this risk is not nearly as great as it is with sperm do-
nors, because of the greater difficulty of achieving pregnancy
through IVF. 2 A limit of ten offspring from one donor, as has
been recommended for sperm donors, provides an acceptable outer
limit to prevent unwitting consanguinity.8" Alternatively, limiting
a woman to three to five donative cycles would achieve this goal as
well as protect women from undergoing too much risk without
greatly reducing the supply of donor eggs. Such a policy should be
a workable guideline until more experience shows that the risks
and benefits require a different balance.
Surprisingly, the need to limit the number of offspring from
single sperm donors to prevent unwitting incest and other unto-
ward effects has not always been recognized. While the American
Fertility Society and other groups have recommended that the
same donor not be used for more than ten offspring, doctors and
sperm banks are under no legal obligation to limit the number of
donors.8 4 An attractive, fertile, and reliable donor will be in de-
mand by banks and recipients, with the result that he could end
81. However, a law limiting the number of cycles or offspring is probably unneces-
sary. In the United States, such a limit on donations could be unconstitutional if alternative
sources of eggs for infertile couples did not exist. See supra note 69.
82. To illustrate, in an extreme case one woman could provide twenty eggs in a sin-
gle cycle, and could donate for ten cycles. All 200 eggs could fertilize and divide. In theory
all 200 could be transferred (fresh or frozen) to receptive endometria, and brought to term.
However, the chance of a woman providing twenty viable eggs in one cycle, fertilizing all
twenty, and having all twenty cleave, implant, and successfully brought to term is ex-
tremely low. The natural wastage rate is high, and IVF technology has not yet been able to
improve it. The probability that the same woman would repeat the performance five much
less ten times is also extremely low. Thus, the danger that a few egg donors will produce a
great number of progeny, thereby increasing the probability of unwitting incest among
persons genetically related to each other, is very low, and clearly lower than could occur
with sperm donors.
83. This natural limit also undercuts the feminist concern that women will be viewed
as professional egg producers, with the demeaning implications which that carries. See
supra note 70.
84. American Fertility Society, supra note 25, at 37S.
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up fathering many children. 5 The possibility that one donor will
produce many offspring and contribute to unwitting incest is much
greater with sperm than egg donors.
E. Paying for Human Oocytes
American and many foreign egg donor programs have taken
two different approaches to the question of paying donors. Pro-
grams or recipients using eggs obtained as a by-product of the
donor's own attempt at IVF have generally not paid the donor for
the donated eggs or for her expenses in procuring them.86 Pro-
grams using donors who are not otherwise undergoing egg re-
trieval usually make a graduated series of payments for each ser-
vice rendered (e.g., for each hormonal injection, blood drawing,
sonogram, laparoscopy or other procedure). The Cleveland Clinic,
for example, will pay donors $800 to $1,200 for one retrieval cycle
(which the recipient ultimately pays).,7 It is also a common prac-
tice to pay women who undergo hyperstimulation and donation
secondary to other surgery.8 The extent to which donors recruited
by the recipient from family or friends are paid is unknown.
Paying women to donate eggs does not violate existing law in
the United States9 Federal law and some states ban the payment
of money for organ donations, but these laws do not cover replen-
ishable tissue such as gametes.9 0 Indeed, sperm donors are com-
monly and legally paid ($25 to $50 per donation is the usual
range). Laws in Florida, Louisiana, and Massachusetts banning
the sale of embryos might apply to embryo donation by lavage,
but their terms would not cover the sale of unfertilized eggs.91 A
85. The greatest danger of unwitting consanguineous marriages would arise in a geo-
graphic area where one donor may be responsible for most offspring born of donor gametes.
86. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
89. An exception is Louisiana, which explicitly outlaws the sale of ovum. LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 9:122 (West Supp. 1988). While some states, such as Virginia, outlaw the
sale of nonrenewable tissue, eggs are arguably renewable, since a supply lasts until meno-
pause, even though new eggs, unlike sperm and blood cells, are not manufactured in the
body. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (1985).
90. Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1985).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05(2) (West Supp. 1988); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9:122
(West Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)IV (Vest 1983). However,
even under these statutes one could argue that the egg rather than the embryo is the object
of sale, with the embryo created by the donor egg and recipient's partner's sperm merely
being the vehicle for delivering the purchased egg.
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ban on paying donors would face constitutional difficulties in the
United States if it impaired the access of infertile couples to donor
eggs.9
2
Payment for human gametes has been outlawed in some
countries,9" and is likely to become more controversial as knowl-
edge of payment practices spread. The ethical objections to paying
egg donors thus require further consideration.
1. Paying Women Who Are Not Undergoing IVF
Perhaps the most serious concerns about payment arise with
women who are not undergoing IVF, who would therefore be re-
ceiving payment not only for transfer of their eggs, but for under-
going the physical burdens of stimulation and surgical removal,
for hyperstimulation alone (when eggs are donated secondary to
other surgery), or for insemination and retrieval by lavage. Paying
for such bodily intrusion is thought to treat the donor and her
body as an object to be bought and sold." It also treats gametic
material, from which a new person might spring, as an object or
commodity to be sold on the market.95 Finally, some persons may
fear that poor women will be disproportionately drawn by finan-
cial need to undergo the physical burdens that service as an egg
donor entails.96
Objections to paying egg donors stem from a religious or
moral view of human dignity that is not universally shared. For
example, the claim that human dignity is diminished by buying
and selling reproductive factors, in the same way that prostitution
demeans or degrades sex, is open to dispute. Many persons would
92. If a ban on payment greatly reduced the number of women willing to donate
eggs and thus the availability of donor eggs, the ban would interfere with the infertile
couple's right to form families noncoitally, and thus may require a compelling governmen-
tal interest justification. Unless actual harm stemming from payment could be shown, the
only justification for the ban would be symbolic or moralistic, which would arguably be an
insufficient justification for interfering with a fundamental right. However, the state could
pursue its moralistic goal if no significant interference with access to donor eggs occurred.
See Robertson, supra note 28, at 1021-23.
93. Australia outlaws the paying of gamete donors. See Infertility (Medical Proce-
dures) Act, Act No. 10,163, § 13(7), (Vict. [Aus.] 1984); WALLER COMMITTEE, supra note
25, at 44.
94. See, e.g., Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need
New Laws, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984 at 50, 51-52.
95. Id.; Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1921-25 (1987).
96. Titmuss argues that financially needy donors also lower the quality of the
donated product and reduce the supply of altruism generally in society. R. TITMus. THE
GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
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find payment for the egg donor's time and effort morally unobjec-
tionable and appropriate, if not also obligatory.17 Indeed, refusing
to pay donors for their efforts seems unfair and exploitative. 98 The
donor is contributing a significant effort that is not morally re-
quired of strangers or even family members. Payment recognizes
the donor's contribution to the enterprise, thus satisfying the re-
ciprocal obligations created by gifts.99 Indeed, paying sperm do-
nors, but not egg donors would unfairly discriminate against
women, who undergo greater risk in order to donate eggs.
Fears about class bias and exploitation of the poor also seem
insufficient to exclude this important source of donor eggs. First,
the recipient's desire to receive good genes will place a premium
on women who are healthy and appear to be of good stock."' 0 Do-
nors-even repeat donors-are as likely to be middle as well as
lower class women. Second, neither the risks nor the payments are
so great that an unacceptable exploitation of poorer persons would
occur. Although donors may require payment, altruistic and re-
productive purposes may also be important.101 Also, many paid
jobs carry higher levels of physical risk (though without the at-
tendant symbolism of reproduction), which people choose out of
their need for money. Limits on the number of donative cycles
would help reduce the risk of unacceptable exploitation. 02
The ethical objections to payment must be balanced against
the need to pay women to assure an egg supply for needy recipi-
ents and to treat donors fairly. Most unrelated women who are not
undergoing IVF would probably need a financial incentive to com-
97. See, e.g., Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
1986, at 28, 29-38.
98. After all, the donor will be undergoing sonograms and blood drawings, as well
as experiencing travel and scheduling inconvenience. Margaret Radin, a strong opponent of
commodification, supports recognition of the claim to payment in some cases as a matter of
justice. See Radin, supra note 95, at 1915-18.
99. M. MAuss, THE GIr (1967); See also Murray, Gifts of the Body and the
Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1987, at 30, 30-35 (1987).
100. Eugenic considerations are unavoidable, and not inappropriate when one is
seeking gametes from an unknown third party.
101. Such a conclusion is speculative or at least premature. Women will be moti-
vated to donate for differing and complex reasons, including an altruistic desire to help an
infertile couple, a narcissistic desire to perpepuate their genes, a meaningful way to
reproduce without undertaking the burdens of gestation or rearing, and the desire for
money. Therefore, the decision may be based upon more complex factors than greed alone,
even when money is paid.
102. Robertson, supra note 28, at 1021-23; see supra notes 80-85 and accompanying
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mit the significant time and effort necessary to serve as an egg
donor, even though other motivations may play a role in their de-
cision to donate eggs. Banning payments would likely result in egg
donation by only those women undergoing IVF or by family mem-
bers or friends-sources insufficient to meet demand. Thus,
couples without a healthy and willing female relative would be
prevented from using donor eggs, even though their medical and
social condition is identical to those with available family donors.
Moral objections to payment unrelated to actual, tangible harm
would not constitute the compelling need necessary to justify in-
terference with the reproductive freedom of infertile couples. °3
On the other hand, a ban on payment would be legally acceptable
if it did not significantly interfere with an infertile couple's access
to donor oocytes.
2. Paying Women Undergoing IVF
While American programs are not currently paying women
who donate eggs retrieved in the course of their own attempts at
pregnancy through IVF, the need to pay them might arise in the
future. Since no extra physical risk is involved, ethical concern
focuses on commodifying the gametic material from which off-
spring might be born, which appears to place a price on the em-
bryos, fetuses, and children that purchased eggs might
engender.0 4
Such a concern is symbolic, because paying women undergo-
ing IVF for extra eggs cannot easily be shown to lead to tangible
harm to offspring or society. If paying donors were essential to
induce them to donate, a symbolic-moral concern alone would not
justify limiting access to donor eggs. However, if other sources of
eggs are available, or women undergoing IVF would be likely to
donate without payment, a payment ban for symbolic reasons
would not significantly interfere with procreative liberty.
Even if laws or IVF program policies prohibited selling eggs
by donors undergoing IVF, recipients could still be asked to pay
103. Robertson, supra note 28, at 1021-23.
104. Annas and Radin seem implicitly to fear such consequences. See supra notes
94-95. It should be noted, however, that permitting payment for oocytes does not imply
that embryos, fetuses, and children could be sold as well, nor that paid surrogacy must also
be allowed. While many of the arguments on each side are similar, the symbolic benefits
and costs of achieving them vary with the factor, activity, or service at issue. However, if
sperm is bought and sold and paid surrogacy is permitted, it would be inconsistent to ban
payment for oocyte donations.
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some portion of the donor's costs of egg retrieval, short of a fee or
profit for the egg itself. Although primarily for her own benefit,
the donor undergoing IVF is investing a significant sum from
which the recipient will also benefit. Asking the recipient to pay
some of her retrieval costs (based on the percentage of eggs
donated) is not unreasonable. Otherwise, the recipient could
achieve an IVF-produced pregnancy at less expense than the oo-
cyte donor who makes her pregnancy possible.105
The cost-sharing parallel that occurs in organ donation is in-
structive. Federal law prohibits the buying and selling of organs
for transplant. Yet the recipient of an organ transplant, rather
than the donor or donor family, pays the cost of maintaining brain
dead cadavers and of surgically removing donated organs. Such
payments are consistent with a policy against the buying and sell-
ing of organs.' 08 A similar policy with donor oocytes might permit
the recipient to share the cost of egg retrieval, without directly
buying and selling oocytes.
F. Ownership of Human Oocytes and Its Responsibilities
Egg donation transfers decisional authority or ownership of
eggs from the donor to another party-to the recipient, the bro-
ker, or the physician coordinating the transfer. Whether or not
commercial transactions occur (i.e., whether money beyond ex-
penses is paid to the donor), ownership or dispositional authority
over the tissue in question still exists. A recipient or physician who
receives control of the egg from the donor becomes the "owner"
for later dispositional decisions.' 7 She or he has the legal right to
decide how the egg will then be used.108
105. Surely public policy should not require that if a person altruistically donates X
(in this case gametes or organs), he or she must also agree to donate Y (the cost of retriev-
ing those gametes or organs). Encouraging altruistic deeds may be more desirable than
hindering them, but it is unclear why one should have a moral or legal obligation to give Y
merely because she has chosen to give X.
106. The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 excludes procurement costs in its
prohibition on paying consideration for organ transplants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West Supp.
1988); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05(2) (West Supp. 1988).
107. If oocytes can be stored for long periods, then they could be transferred at
death by devise or statute to persons who would then have dispositional authority. Ques-
tions of whether control over egg donations survive the death of the donor would depend on
estate law, and are beyond the scope of this article.
108. It should be obvious that the person with dispositional control of the egg and
even the embryo resulting from the egg does not "own" the child born as a result. While
rearing or custodial parents may be free to relinquish them for adoption, together with
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It is unclear what the ultimate structure and organization of
the egg procurement industry will be. Unlike sperm banking,
where independent firms unconnected with the physicians per-
forming the insemination often provide the sperm, IVF programs
will, because of the technical skills required, likely be the primary
brokers, or buyers and sellers of ova. 109 Future developments in
freezing eggs might lead to independent egg banks which provide
eggs to infertile couples or infertility programs for treatment or
research. Efficiency and efficacy, rather than symbolism, should be
the driving force in determining the shape and organization of egg
procurement.
Donors, physicians, brokers, banks, and others involved in the
procurement and transfer of human oocytes will have legal obliga-
tions to use due care in their handling and disposition of donor
eggs. A donor could be legally liable for intentionally hiding infor-
mation about an infectious disease or adverse genetic history that
may pose risks to the recipient or offspring. Physicians and bro-
kers coordinating egg donations would also have a legal duty to
screen potential donors so that risks to recipients and offspring are
reduced. If eggs are sold, questions of the warranties of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code might also arise." 0 Intentional
or negligent mishandling of eggs could lead to tort liability for
destruction of reproductive possibilities, just as negligent destruc-
tion of stored embryos could."'
rights to control their education, religious training, and health care, there is much more
limited dispositional authority over children than over gametes and even embryos.
109. This is not invariably the case. Some programs, in order to avoid recruitment
problems, ask the couple to come to the clinic with an egg donor that they have recruited
themselves. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Since the couple and donor will
then be known, this method has the possibility of future complications, or alternatively, of
benefits for all involved.
110. A court might find that services rather than goods are being provided by the
donor. Even if eggs are deemed to be sold, the strictures of the Uniform Commercial Code
may be too severe for the gametic transactions in question. The donor should not be re-
sponsible for warranting the fitness of the egg for its intended purpose. Warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code should not apply to donors,
as long as they are open and honest in their representations about their condition. Perhaps
oocyte brokers should have to give greater warranties or protection. Surely the donor
should not be held to guarantee pregnancy from the donated ova, or warrant against all
genetic or infectious defects. See also Annas, supra note 94, at 51-52; Chapman, Retailing
Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393
(1983).
111. See Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Cryopreservation of Human Em-
bryos, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 371, 379-80 (1987).
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VIII. RESEARCH WITH DONOR EGGS
While most eggs will be donated to treat an infertile couple,
some women may be asked to donate eggs for use in research,
with no intent to initiate pregnancy. Indeed, the availability of do-
nor oocytes opens the door to many kinds of research with ova and
embryos that was not previously possible. For example, research
into the conditions and window for optimal transfer and implanta-
tion of embryos in the human can now occur. Embryos created
with donor oocytes can be transferred on different days of the re-
cipient's cycle and the results compared in order to determine the
best synchrony of conceptus, endometrium, and steroidal
interactions."1 2
Another area of research will be the ability to test gametic
function. If apparently normal spermatozoa and oocytes do not
fertilize, donated oocytes can be used to test the fertilizing power
of each, thus giving the ability to diagnose infertility at the micro-
scopic level."13 It will also facilitate research into the freezing of
eggs for later thawing. While much of this research is directed at
gametes, at some point it will require fertilization of the egg to
test gametic function, thus producing embryos solely for research
purposes and implicating the concerns that have made embryo re-
search controversial." 4
There are no serious ethical barriers to research uses of donor
eggs if the woman providing the ovum consents, and the research
does not involve fertilization of the donor oocyte. 11 When fertili-
zation of the oocyte occurs as part of the research, however, the
ethical issues and special rules concerning research with embryos
will come into play.
Although these rules have not been completely settled, a wide
consensus supports embryo research in many circumstances." 6 A
112. Rosenwaks, supra note 6, at 905-07.
113. Id. at 906-07.
114. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. Egg donation may also lead to
research on the psychosocial effects of collaborative reproduction involving gamete and em-
bryo donors and surrogates. An important issue for study will be the importance of the
female genetic bond for donors and offspring in the absence of rearing and gestation. Pro-
grams providing egg donation can facilitate such research by keeping adequate records and
cooperating with later inquiries.
115. The most serious ethical questions would arise when women not otherwise un-
dergoing IVF or surgery provide eggs for research purposes only. Even in this situation the
benefits of research may be deemed sufficient to justify the risk to which the donors know-
ingly consent.
116. Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 W. ONTARIO L. REV. 15 (1986).
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major distinction concerns whether the resulting embryo will be
transferred to a uterus or not. If embryo transfer after research
will not harm the resulting child, it is permitted.117
On the other hand, fertilizing donor eggs for research pur-
poses with no intention or chance of transfer is a controversial
topic, even though such a practice is necessary for many kinds of
research, such as testing gametic function.' 18 Both Victoria, Aus-
tralia, and New South Wales have made the practice criminal,
and national ethics commissions in France and West Germany
have recommended against the practice. 119 However, the Warnock
Committee and Ontario Law Reform Commission found it accept-
able for many purposes.' Although controversy remains, donat-
ing oocytes to create embryos for research purposes with no possi-
bility of transfer is a legal option in Great Britain, Canada, the
United States and many other countries.' 2'
IX. FREEZING EGGS
Development of the ability to cryopreserve and thaw oocytes
will not have a major impact on the ethical, legal, and policy is-
sues discussed here, though it would have an impact on the freez-
ing of embryos. (Freezing and discarding eggs will be more read-
ily done than freezing and discarding embryos). Ethical concerns
about offspring status, donor risk, and commercialization are the
same whether donor eggs are inseminated fresh or after a cry-
opreserved donor egg has been thawed.
If donor eggs are cryostored for later thawing and insemina-
tion, the storing party should specify dispositonal instructions in
the event of such contingencies as death, divorce, and unavailabil-
ity. Concerns about the length of storage and the posthumous use
of stored gametes may also arise, as they have with frozen sperm
117. Indeed, it is unlikely that a successful pregnancy would result from preim-
plantation research, which is harmful to the embryo and resulting child.
118. For example, eggs must be fertilized to determine the effects of freezing and
thawing, thus creating an embryo solely as a result of the research. Objections to this
practice seem to be symbolic or moralistic, since many of those opposed to the practice
would accept research on embryos of similar age that resulted from an attempt to achieve
pregnancy by IVF. See Robertson supra note 116, at 30.
119. Id. at 35-36. Victoria, Australia, which had banned research with embryos cre-
ated solely for that purpose, now permits research with fertilized eggs not discarded in the
IVF process until the point of syngamy.
120. See id.
121. Robertson, supra note 111, at 374-75.
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and embryos.12 2 However, the issues unique to egg donation arise
only when a cryopreserved egg is donated to a party who has not
produced the egg.
CONCLUSION
Donor eggs appear to be a medically viable option for the
thousands of women who are unable to provide genetically suita-
ble oocytes for fertilization. Although not likely to be as widely
used as donor sperm, many IVF programs will offer the technique.
The ethical, legal, and policy issues presented by egg dona-
tion arise from the separation of the female genetic and gesta-
tional bond, and from the relative scarcity and inaccessability of
ova, as compared to sperm. Neither of these differences, however,
make egg donation as a means of overcoming infertility, or for use
in research, ethically or legally unacceptable.
Indeed, egg donation may be the least problematic of
noncoital collaborative reproductive techniques, because each
rearing parent has a biological connection with the offspring. Al-
though the gestating and rearing mother will not be the genetic
mother, and the genetic mother neither gestates nor rears, the re-
sulting family situation should not pose major problems for off-
spring, families, or donors. The law is likely to recognize agree-
ments to exclude the egg donor from rearing rights and duties,
and may enforce some agreements for the donor to participate in
rearing.
Egg donation does involve the possibility of greater risk for
donors than occurs with sperm donation, at least when donors are
not also undergoing IVF. Yet the risks are not so much greater
than those of other accepted activities that donation should be dis-
couraged. Nor would payments to donors be illegal or unethical,
though some persons would disagree and ban payments to egg do-
nors as morally offensive.
A final lesson from this survey of issues in egg donation is the
speed with which reproductive developments based on ovarian
stimulation and in vitro fertilization are occurring. Perfecting the
technology of egg donation will lead in turn to further control over
the reproductive process, and eventually enhance the ability to in-
fluence the genetic makeup of offspring. Clear thinking and rea-
122. Id.
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sonable practices with donor eggs will facilitate future develop-
ment of noncoital techniques for forming families.
